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Subrogation of Insurers.
Introduction - General Doctrine.
The doctrine of subrogation, like many of the purely
equitable doctrines of English jurisprudence, owes its
origin to the civil law of Rome. From the imperfect
sketches in the Digest and the other compilations of Jus-
tinian enough can be gathered to show that subrogatiori,or
substitution, was considered from two points of view, ac-
cording as the transfer,.e p4nated from the creditor or the
debtor. In the former case it was a cession which trans-
fey.s the claim itself with all its accessories to him b"
whom it had been paid. In the latter it was no more than
the application of the securit- of the ancient claim to(1)
that which arose from the loan . The ancient law of
France had to choose between these two; but until the
time of Pothier, the doctrine was hopelessly confusing,
both to the jurists and the courts. He settled the
controversy once for all, and the definition he formulated
(1) Digest L. 36, L. 18
arid presented in his treatise on the subject, is substan-
tially the same as that generally acceltd now. UI, says
" Subrogation is a fiction of law by which the creditor
is considered to cede his rights, actions, mortga-es,
and privileges to him from whom he has received his due."
The nature of the subrogation is immaterial; whether it
is with the consent of the debtor or the creditor, the
peinciple remains the same. In all cases, the one sub-
rogated is considered rather to have bought the creditor's
claim, than to have paid it; acquiring not merely the01)
same securities, but the claim itself.
Just when subrogation was first applied, by English
courts cannot be told, but it is fair to assume that a
principle so firmly established in the civil law, and so
much iA accordance with natural justice was among the
first to attract courts of equity.
(1) Essay on the nature and General Effects of Subroation byM.
MoulQV,in Revue de Droit Francais et Estranger, trans-
lated in 4 Am. L. Rev., 135.
However, equity originally had sole cognizance of it,
though recent times have seen it applied with increasing
(2)
frequency in courts of common law. In this country, the
doctrine has been further applied arid developed than in
England, due largely to the favor with which Chancellor
(1)
Kent regarded it. As a purely equitable right, the gen-
eral rules of equity apply. Consequently, the extent to
which it will be recognized depends upon the circumstances
(2)
of the case, and will be granted or refused, as justice
(3) (4)
and good conscience demand, regardless of form and inde-
pendent of any contract between the parties affected b,:
(5)
it. It cannot be enforced to the detriment of equal or(a)
superior equities, nor where it would operate to the
(7)
prejudice or injury of others. A suitor must come with
(8) (0)
clean hands, and his right may be barred for laches,
(2) Boyd V. 1, c Donough 39 How. 389; Lafarge V.Harter 9 I1.Y.241
(1) 14 Y. J. i7q. 234; 43 Pa. St. 518
(2) M.atthews V. Aikin I IT. Y. 595.
(3) Bispham's Eq. Juris. 338; 7 Johns Ch. 213.
(4) 25 iT. J. Eq. 2101
(5) 1 I. Y. 595; 52 Pa. St. 522.
(6) Bisphams 338. (7) 92 Pa. St. 36
(8) 57 Ill. 24. (9) 57 Ill. 24
Droadly stated the doctrine includes every instance in
which one party pas a debt for which another is prirnarily
liable, and which, in equity and good conscience, should
(10)
have been discharged by the latter. A more volunteer or
stranger, however, cannot by making himself a party to an
obligation for the payment of a debt, acquire as against
the original debtor a right to be subrogated to the action
(11)
of the creditor.
Subrogation is confined to the relation of principal
(1)
and surety,guarantors, to insurers paying losses, and
to a person who has been compelled to pay a debt of a
(2)
third person in order to protect his own rights. Thus the
right is very comprehensive in its application, the sole
inquiry being- "Is the party claiming it equitably enti-
tled to its exercise ?" Therefore, it does not depend
(3)
upon the doctrine of suretyship alone, as has been suppos-
ed, though in most of the cases where it arises, the re-
(4)
lation is analogous to suretyship. "The right of subro-
gation results from the natural justice of placing the
(5)
charge where it ought to rest."
(10) 2S U. Y. 271; Sheldon Sub. 1.
(11) 14 11. J. .Pq. 234.
(1) 73 N. Y. 399.
(2) 66 I.. Y. 363; 42 N. Y. 89.
(3) Brant on "Suretyship '- Guarant-" 262. Shelton on "Subro-
gation " 11; C0 11. Y. 366.
(4) Thomas on Aortgages p. 183; 55 IT.Y.350..C&)2 Ld.cases in~q.U l
(C)
Neither is it dependent upon Lrivyity of contract. On the
contrary, the part-' claiming the right, is put in exactly
the same position as the assignee of a mortgage- it is, in
fact, an "equitable assignment", as 1.r. Pomeroy prefers
(7)
to call it.
Now having briefly' stated the origin and general
principles of subrogation, the main object of this paper
will be to discuss,more or less in detail,its application
in the law of insurance; and first, as it is applied to
marine insurers in the case of abandonment.
Subrogation of Marine Insurers
As commonl: stated, the act of abandonment by the
assured, his agents or assigns, when accepted, has, in
law, all the effect of a valid assignment. Then the under-
writer stands in the place of the assured, becomes the
owner of the property abandoned, with the spes recuper-
(1)
andi. and all the rights and remedies incident thereto.
(6) 23 Pa. St. 294; 1 N.Y. 595
(7) Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. 1211 - 13
(1) 13 Pet. 387; 104 MJass. 507: I Johns 106; Sheldon on
Subrogation 221.
The abandonment transfers ipso facto all the interest
of the assured to the underwriters, so far as the inter-
est is covered by the policy, and relates back to the
time of the loss. The title of the underwriters is
perfect when a valid abandonment has been ,-ade and accejpt-
(2)
ed. By that act "the insurer renounces and yields up
to the underwriter all his right, title, and claims to
what may be saved, and leaves it to him to make the most
of it for his own benefit. The underwriter then stands
in the place of the insured, and becomes legally entitled
to all that may be saved from destructiflz." A peculiar
right of the insurers, modifying the right to subrogation,
is to take possession of the damaged propert:y, restore it
to a serviceable condition, and offer it again to the in-
sured, who is bound to accept it, if within a reasonable
time, and there is no defect in the repairs; otherwise,(1)
the abandonment remains in full power.
(2) 15 Blatchf. 58; 7 Biss. (c. c. ) 35
(3) Stor y J., in Comerys V. Vasse, 1 Peters, 103.
(1) 9 Wall, 401
Both these rights are based on the character of the ins i-
ance policy which is essentially one of indemnity; and
are riot contingent upon the loss having been total, or
(2)
upon its having been followed b: an abandonment. Wh e ere
the loss is total, recovery may be had on the policy
without an abandonment, since where there has been total
(3)
destruction there is nothing upon which it may operate.
By the act of subrogation, the insurer assumes the burdens
as well as the benefits attaching to the property, even
(4)
though the loss has not been actually paid.
The same principles apply to a policy of insurance
on freight as to those on ship and cargo, with such dif-
ferences as the nature of the subject .iatter renders
necessary. T qhere the ship and freight are separately
insured, the insured, upon abandonment can recover for(1)
a total loss of both. The freight earned before the loss
occurred, would go to the ship owner, while the freight
earned subsequently to the loss would belong to the insur-(2)
er, who becomes owner by the abandonment.
(2) 13 Wall. 3u7; 105 U. S. st 634-5; 125 U. S. at ,.462
(3) 13 Wall. 367.
(4) 18 Wend. 152; Sheldon on Sub. 221; 7 Biss. 35.
(1) 15 Mass. 341.
(2) 9 Johns. 186.
There might be question as to the priority of title to
the freight money between the two sets of insurers, upon
an abandonment; but in any case, the right of the insurer
upon the freight is superior to that of the insured clair.%-
ing in his own right.
Subrogation against Carrier or other
Wrong-doer for Torth causing the Loss.
It is well settled, both in marine insurance and in
fire insurance upon land, that the insurance company may
be subrogated to the assured's right of action against
the 'carrier qor other third person responsible for
(4)
the loss. No express stipulation in the policy of insur-
ance, or abandonment by the assured, is necessary to per-
foct the title of the insurer. From the very nature of
the contract, the insurer, when he has paid to the assured
the amount of the indemnity, is entitled , by way of sal-
vage, to the benefit of anything that may be received,
either from the remnants of the goods, or from damages
(1)
paid by third persons for the same loss.
(3)ii East 232; Sheldon 228
(/ )129 U. S. 462; 105 U. S. 630; 117 U. S. 312,321,Phiilipp s
on Insurance 1723.
(1) 117 U. S. 312.
lie is entitled to all the rights and remedies which the
assured !,ad. The assured has practically a double remedy,
either a,,ainst the carrier for the loss, or against the
insured on the contract of insurance. If he accepts the
former, the insurers escape; but if he proceed a-ainst
the insurers in the fiv.st place, the latter are entitled
to recoup themselves from the carrier. The liability of
the carrier or wrong-doer is considered first or princi-
(2)
pal; that of the insurer, secondary. The insurer is
subrogated to the rights and remedies of the assured not
(3)
by having an independent claim, but solely because he has
paid a loss for which the Carrier was primarily liable;
and the contract of insurance being one of indemnity, the
insurer, when he has indemnified the insured, is equitably
entitled to succeed to the rights which he had against the
(4)
carrier or other party whose wrongful act caused the loss.
(2)25 Conh 265; 3 App. Caa. 279.
(3)Sheldon 223; 25 Conn. 265
(4)139 'Mass. 508
10.
The earliest English precedents in recognition of this
subrogation of the insurer against the wrong-doer go back(1) (2)
as far as 1748. Lord 1Lansfield, in Mason V. Sainsbury,
an action prosecuted for the benefit of the insurer against
the Hundr-ed, held that, payment by the insurer could not
avail the defendant as a defense. "The act" he says,
"puts the Hundred in the place of the trespasser; and on
principles of policy, I amn satisfied it is to be consid-
ered as if the insurers had not paid a farthing."
Numerous American cases carry out the same doctrine. In
the case of Hart V. R. R. Co. subrogation was decreed
where a building was destroyed by sparks from defendant's
locomotive. Chief Justice Shaw said that the owner and
the insurer were "in effect one person, having together
the beneficial right to an indemnity.- -- If,therefore,
the owner demands and receives payment of that very loss
from the insurer, as he may, by virtue of his contract,
there is a manifest equity in transferring the right to
indemnitr, which he holds for the common benefit, to the
insurer.,, The insured is equitably entitled to but one
recovery; but he may make his choice of the wrong-doer
or the insurer.
(l)Randall V. Cockran 1 Ves. Sr. 98
(2)3 Douglas (1; also 2 B. (C C. 254; 4 Bing. !T. C. 272.
11.
If he elects to receive damages from the virori:-doerthe
amount so received will be applied pro tanto in discharge(1)
of the polic:,-; but if he applies first to the insurer,and
receives his whole loss, he holds his claim against the
wrong-doer in trust for the insurers, and is bound to
make an equitable assignment to the latter, or, on fail-
(2)
ure, the insurer can recover in the name of the assured.
If the insurer after payment of the damages caused by the
wrong-doer to the assured, voluntarily, pays the policy,
he cannot, in 11. Y'., maintain an action against the wrong-
doer'. But the carrier cannot set up the payment by the
insurer, as satisfaction, in whole or in part, of the
claim, nor can he call upon the insurer for contribution
And if the ",rong-doer pays the assured, after pa-Yment by
the assurer, with knowledge of that fact, it is a fraud
upon the latter and will not relieve the wrong-doer from
(5)
liability to him. In Illinois it is 1jossible to restrain
the insured, at the suit of the insurer, who had paid the
loss, from making a settlement of his claim against the(6)
wrong-doer.
(1)73 IT. Y. 245
(2)13 Met. 99; 8 Johns 245; Pa. St. 515.
(3)73 i. Y. 245.
(4)11 Pa. St. 515
(5)73 N. Y. 245; 13 M1et. 99; 16 Wend. 397
(W)2 Bradw. 609
At common law, in United States Courts, and the
courts of many of the States, the insurer's right of ac-
tion a-ainst the wron-doer, must be brought in the name(1)
of the assured; but in states having the reformed proced-
ure, the action is brought in the name of the real party
(2)
in interest.
Effect of Stipulation in Bill of Lading;.
There is no settled rule as to the effect of a stipu-
lation in the bill of lading that the carriers shall have
the benefit of the insurance obtained by the owner afainst
loss or damage to the goods for which the carrier would be
liable. The first case in this country giving to the com-
mon carrier, by special contract, the right to limit, re-
stric, or modify, his common law liability as an insurer
of the transportation of goods, was jlerchantile ""Jut. Ins.
(3)
Co. V. Calebs (1859) The court stated the rule as fol-
lows:- "That such an agreement neither changes nor inter-
feres with any rule of law, and does not affect public
morals nor conflict with public interests. If the owner
chooses to take upon himself part of the risk of transpor-
tation, and thereby induces the carrier to convey for a
less rate of compensation, who has any right to complain ?
(I)L. R. 3 App. Cas. 279; ll U. S. 584; 13 Yiall. 367; 11
Pa. St., 515
(2)73 N.Y. 399; 49 YWis.625; 41 Fed. R. 043 ( Ark.)
(3)20 H.Y. 173.
12.
It is a matter entirely between themselves, unless it is
the result of a scheme to defraud third persons. It has
long been determined, both in England and in this country
that such an agreement is valid and binding, and in the
absence of fraud can at all times be enforced." 13at while
the U. S. courts, and most of the State Courts enforce a
similar doctrine, varying the common law liability of car-
riers, they do not carry it to the same extent. In 1.Y.
the carrier can stipulate for exemption from all liability
whatsoever, not excepting cases of gross negligence; but
the U. S. courts and most of the state courts repudiate
this view of the case, holding that it is against public
policy so completely to exempt the carrier, particulary as
he occupies a position of advantage, and is able to dic-
tate whatever terms he pleases to the shipper. The
better rule limits the right of exemption to cases involv-(1)
ing only ordinary negligence. But the substantial cor-
rectness of the doctrine cannot be disputed; and it is
now almost universall'r admitted that the right of the in-
surer to subrogation does not exist where there is a
previous contract between the assured and the carrier,
giving to the latter the benefit of the insurance upon
payment of the loss.
(1)17 Wall. 357; 90 U.S. 123; 93 U.2. 17z 129,U.S. 397;
24 i. Y[. C. (Pa. ) 385.
13.
21.
The opinion of Justice Gray in Phoenix Ins. Co. V. Erie
(1)
Tr. Co., is generally regarded as stating the correct
doctrine. lie says, "the title of the insurer arises out
of the contract of insurance, and is derived from the as-
sured alone, and can only be enforced in the right of
the latter, x x x The right of action against another
person the equitable interest in which passes to the in-
surer, being only that which the assured had, it follows
that, if the assured had no such right of action, none
passes to the insurer; and that, if the assured's right
of action is limited or restricted by lawful contract
between him and the person sought to be made responsible
for the loss, a suit by the insurer, in the right of the
assured, is subject to like limitations or restrictions."
Such a stipulation then, cuts off the right of the insurer
to dama-es whether by virtue of the doctrine of subroga-
tion or by express assignment. It has even been held that
it is not necessary to insert the stipulation in the bill
of lading, but that it would be "equally valid when clear-
ly proved to exist by extrinsic evidence."
(l}117 U. -. 312; See also 125 U. S. 397 (1889); 108 IT.Y.353
63 Tex. 475; 139 MAass,, 508.
(1) 23 Fed. R. 88.
Put the owner of the goods lost may still recover from
the carrier, notwithstanding the stipulation in the bill
of lading, if he has not actually realized anything from
(2)
the insurer.
Effect of Warranty in policy.
The effect of this right of the carrier to stipulate
for the benefit of the insurance, is to throw the burden
of the loss almost entirely upon the insurer; the carrier
being liable only for the damage beyond the amount of the
policy. To protect themselves in such a case, the insur-
ance company now generally incorporate in their policies
a clause of warrantY , that the insurance "shall not inure
to the benefit of any carrier."i The validity of such a
stipulation can no more be questioned than the correspond-
ing right of the carrier to stipulate for the benefit of
the insurance. "The insurance companii vas under no legal
obligation to issue a policy at all,but,if it dia,it had a
right to place a provision in the policy such as it did,
and in doing so it neither contravened an,. public policy',nor
(3)
restrained trade. " The whole question rests upon the
contract rights of the parties.
(2)121 U. S. 128
(5)Ins. Co. V. Easton ( Sup. Ct. Tex. ) 130.
If the assured enters into a contract with the carrier in
conflict with a provision in a polic, that the insurance
company shall be entitled to subrogation, and that the
insured will make no agreement, nor do any act,whereby
his rights of action against the carrier for losses shall(1)
be released, the insured cannot recover on the policy.
(2)
In Carstairs V. Mechanic's and Traders Iris. Co., the
the stipulation in the policy was only for subrogation to
all claims against the transporter of merchandise. The
court held, "The insurance company being practically in
the position of a surety, and having a right to subroga-
tion, and the plaintiffs, having by terms of the bill of
lading under which they claim the goods, defeated the right
they, cannot be allowed to recover in the action." So,
where the policies contained subrogation clauses, and
the bill of lading also stipulated for the benefit of the
insurance, and the shipper brought suit against the car-
rier, it was held that the policies could riot be made
available for the benefit of the carrier as a condition
(3)
precedent to the shipper's recover-,.
(1)118 1. Y. 324
(2)18 Fed. R. 88
(53)129 U. S. 128.
17.
It has further been hold in Pennsylvania that where a
policy contained a condition requiring an assignment of
the assured's cause of action, that any release on his
part which made "performance of the covenant to assign
either impossible or useless, would relieve the insurance
(1)
company of its concurrent covenant to pay; " but the right
(2)
to subrogation must be express.
It appears, however, that notwithstanding these
stipulations in policies and bills of lading, the insur-
ed still retains his right of action against the carrier,
though he forfeits all claims upon his policy. In the
cases just mentioned, the stipulations in the policies
antedate the contract with the carrier, and there has been
no decision rendered in a case where the policy was is-
sued subsequently to the bill of lading; but there seems
to be no reason to suppose that the contract rights of the
parties would be changed.
It should riot be forgotten that in all cases the
right to subrogation depends upon the insurer having paid
(3)
in full the liability which gave rise to such right.
123 Pa. St. 516.
123 Pa. St. 523
6 W1atts. (Pa.) 221.
Insurer Sdbrogation to Rights of a Xortgagee.
A much-mooted question affecting the doctrine of
subrogation is, whether an insurance company can, upon
pa.nr1-1t of loss to a mortgagee, compel art equitable as-
signment to it of the latter's rights and remedies against
the mortgagor. The discussions of this fruitful topic
rest mainly in dicta and proceed on its analogies to
suretyship and abandonment, as though subrogation grew
put of those doctrines, whereas, in truth, it is as old
or older than either of them, and derives its force and
effect solely from consideration of equity and good con-
(l)
science. "Vqat are the rights of the parties,"is the
determining question in all cases, and unless it can be
shown from all the circumstances in the case, that the
insurance company is equitably entitled to subrogation,
it will not be decreed. It is well settled that where
the policy expressly provides for such subrogation and(1)
assignment the insurer's right is unquestionable.
(lf IT. Y. 595; Sheldon 93
(1)32 Ill. 221; 71 'lo. 5 67; 10 Mo. App. 376; 43 N1. Y. 38P
70 N. Y. 19; 71 Pa. St. 234.
2 a
But if there is neither ar provision irn the policy nor
an' actual assignment, the insurer's right to damand it,
is not so clear. Decisions either wa-,r bearing directly
upon the point are rare; but the decided Proionderance
of opinion is in favor of the insurer's right upon paying
the loss, and if necessary, the balance due on the mort-
gage with interest. All the cases holding this way
assign for reasons that, to allow the mortgagee to have a
double satisfaction, to the pa.-merit of the insurance and
the mortgage debt, would be to ignore the principles of
suretyship, to sanction a system of wager which would be
contrary to the policy of the law, and to furnish a dan-
(2)
gerous temptation to incendiarism. In many cases also,
the right of subrogation is based upon the alleged in-
equity of permitting the mortgagee to receive and retain
(3)
both sums. M.iassachusetts is the only state in the
Union which distinctly lays dov'n the rule that a mortgagee
is entitled to both sums, where the policy was taken in
his own name and for his own benefit, whether the policy
expressly provides for subrogation or not. That side of
the controversy is upheld solely by the able arguments
presented by Chief Justice Shaw in King V. Ins. Co.jl)
(2)17 Pa. St. 253; Thorias on ,,ortgages pp 183-4
(3)17 Ii.Y. 428; 43 N.Y. 389; 55 N.Y. 348; 2 Dutcher 541
(1)7 Cush. 1.
;10
unnecessary to the decision of the case, it is true, but
consistently followed in other decisions of the same court
(2)
especially in Suffolk Iris. Co. V. Foden. The learned
Chief Justice sa-s; "Wre are inclined to the opinion, both
upon principle and authority, that when a mortgaf-ee causes
insurance to be made for his own benfit, pa71ing the pre-
mium from his own funds, in case a loss occurs before his
debt is paid, he has a right to receive the total loss fo'
his own benefit; that he is not bound to account to the
mortgagor for any part of the mone,: so recovered, as a
part of the mortgage debt; it is not a payment in whole
or in part; but he has still a right to recover his whole
debt of the mortgagor. AndiL, so on the other hand, when
the debt is thus paid by the debtor, the money is not,
in law or in equity, the money of the insurer who has
thus paid the loss, or money paid to his use. - - -
There is no privity of contract or of estate, in fact or
in law, between the insurer and the mortgagor; but each
IT
has a separate and independent contract with the mortgagee.
Thus,he goes on to argue,that if the mortgagor cannot
claim the insurance money, it seems a fortiorithat the
insurer cannot claim to charge his loss upon the mortgagor
which he would do, if he were entitled to an assignment
of the mortgage-debt, either in full or pro tanto.
---------------------------------------------------------
(2)9 AllenT.
21.
Unquestionably this ar.- iment is open to .rave criticism in
that it might with equal justice be applied in case of a
sureti claiming under his principal. It will be noticed
also, that in this case the insxrnce corrparu tried to
enforce the assignment of the mortgagee's claims before
paying the loss under the policy. Even those courts
which uphold the doctrine of subrogation, make that a con-
dition precedent to a right of compelling an assignment
of the morty-.ace. On this ground the opinion of Chief
Justice Shaw, vwherd it discusses the right of subrogation,
is mere dictum; sirce by all the authorities, the right
could not arise until at least the amunt of the policy(1)
was paid. This is equally true in marine insurance, and
in actions against a carrier or wrong-doer, as h-as al .-esd
(2) (3)
been discussed. In Suffolk Ins. Co. V. Boyden, however,
while the same argument is employ-ed as in 7 Cushing, I.,
subrogation was denied, even though an offer was made by
the insurer to pay the loss and amount due upon the mort-
gage. To the question why the mortgagor sho-ld not pay
the premiums and be entitled to treat the debt as can-
celled, it is answered, "because the insurance is a
wholly collateral contract which the law allows the mort-
sa-r-ee to make ,with which the mortgagor is not concerned."
---------------------------------------------
(l)Prsvelt J., 17 N.Y. 435, 441, 442; 8 S.E. (Va.) 719 (1 ° )
(2)6 W7atts ( Pa. ) 221.
t,19 Allen 123.
210-
And in concluding the court sa' : "The whole consider-
ation proceeds from the mo'trga,ee; if there is no loss
by the fire he looses the whole amoLnt paid without any
claim upon the mortgagor for compensation. The premiums
paid are intcrided to be a just compensation for the sum
(1)
to be received upon the happening of a contingent event."
The cases upholding the doctrine of subro ;ation are
numerous, but few are directly in point. In the opinion
(2)
of Chancellor V-!alaworth in Aetna Ins. Co. V. Tyler, the
point came up collaterally. The case of Smith V.
(3)
Coltmbia Ins. Co. furnishes a close analogy to the case
under discussion. The principal reasons which induced
the court to hold that the insurers were entitled to sub-
rogation, arose out of the nature of the case. There had
been prior mortgages effected upon the property concealed
by the assured, and the insurers were deceived in assum-
ing the risk at a lower rate of premium than they other-
wise would have done. The right of the insurers to the
cession of the securities was, however, based strictly
(4)
upon the doctrine of subrogation. In Carpenter V. Ins. Co
the doctrine was simply announced as an Qbiter dictu.
(1)9 Allen 123; 8 Hare 216; 10 Allen 283.
(2)16 e nd. 397; also 21 Pa. St. 513.
(3)17 Pa. St. 253.
W)16 Pet, 405,
(5)
Tot so, however, the case of Ins. Co. V. Woodruff, in
which the insurable interest of the defendant was in the
shape of collateral securities, held as a lien upon
certain property of the mortgagor for the payment of a
debt. The case presents an able discussion of the right
of the insurer to be subrorated, not only to the mortga-
ge, but to any collateral by. which the debt is secured,
and forcibly criticizes the opinion of Chief Justice Shaw
in King V. Ins. Co. (supra.) Among the later cases(1)
supporting this doctrine, is Honore V. Ins. Co. , where
the insurance was upon 74 barrels of whiskey by the mort-
gagee. The case was dismissed on the ground that to -ve
the mortgagee a right to enforce his claim arainst the
mortgagor,after payment by the insurance company,would be
to favori wager policies,and to furnish a dangerous terta-
(2)
tion to incendiarism. In Norwich Ins. Co. V. Boomer,
the mortgagor paid the premiums and was the beneficiary.
The right of the insurer to subrogation has come up
so many times collaterally in 11. Y., Ii. J., and Pa. and
has been so thoroughly discussed, that it is doubtful if
any- direct decisions will ever change it.
(5) 2 Dutcher ( I. J. ) 541
(2) Ill. 442; see also 80 Ill. 532
In the cases in 11. Y. which hold that a stipalation in a
policy for subrogation carl be enforced, the ccalrts are
(I.)
uninamous that it can be decreed ,-ithout such stipulation.
(2)
A late case in I. Y. , Thomas V. Lloritauk Iris. Co. , entitles
the insurance company to subrogation without a stipulation
in the policy to that.effcct, citing as aathorities,(3) (4)
Aetna Ins. Co. V. Ty ler, Kernochan V. Ins. Co.,
(5)
and Excelsior Ins. Co. V. Royal Irs. Co. 111e se t o
last cases give an exhaustiVe discussion of the right of
the insurer to subrogation. In the former Strong J.,
says: "It is a mere equity to be put in the place of the
insured as to that sumn, in regard to the bond and mort-
gage, whatever his rights ma-, be. This equity does not
arise out of the contract of insurance, but from all the
circmmstances of the case."
A strong argument in favor of the insurer and one
usually employed is, that the contract of insurance is an
indemnit against the loss of the debt by a loss or
damage to the property mortgaged; and, therefore, as
Judge Folger so well expresses it; "If the mortgag-cd
rroperty is,after the loss occurs, still enouh in value
(1) 70 11. Y. 1C; 43 1. Y. 320; 60 2. v. 363.
(2) 4 3 Hun. 213 (1387)
(3) 10 Vend. 335
(4) 17 11. Y. 442
(5) 55 -,5
to pay the debt, there :ias been in effect no loss; that
the insurer, havinr: paid the mortgae'e, is titled to the
(1)
mort-!e-cd property. The mort,,agor is riot taken into
account in this ar&muirierit; nor does there seem to be an,
good reason wh'r he sho lId be, if subrogation amounts to
an'thiri - The equities of both the mortr-a,-ee and the
insurer who succeeds to his rights, are superior to those
of the mortgagor. All the text-books and the cases in
every jurisdiction where the subject has come up, hold
that the mortgagor has no right to have the insurance
morne, go in discharge of the debt where the insurance is
effected b-" the mortgagee himself in his own name, and
(2)
paid for by himself with his own funds.. The question
then rests between the mortgagee and the insurer; as to
whether the former by virtue of so-called independent
(3)
contract is entitled to both suLms; or whether the latter
upon securing the mortgagee from all losses, and by virtue
of his contract of indemnity is equitably entitled to an
assignment of the mortgag;e. Th latter, it appears to me,
is the better doctrine. Certainly it harmonizes better
the interests of all parties.
(1) 55 II. Y. 343, 355.
(2) Vood, on F. Insurance 471; 7 Cush. 1; b atch. 541;
s. c. 25 I. J. 541.
(3) 7 Qush, 1; 4 .llen 123,
The mortgagor only has to pay his debt as in t}be other
case; the mortgat-ee receives his debt or its equivalent,
the premiuzns paid on the policy arid interest if necessary,
so tlbat he vlas secured that which he wished to secure by
the policy; and the insurance compar," simply becomes the
creditor of the mortgagor in place of the mort';aree, as he
might have become by means of an express assigiment of
the mortgage or other securities.
The mortgagor also has ample means of protection;
(1)
for if the polici is taken out in his na ne, or if it is
taken out in the name of the mortgagee and the premiums
paid by the mortgagor, or if, by virtue of an agreement
between the two, the mortgagor is the benef ciary; party,
then the right of the insurer to subro Tation is cut off,
and the insurance money goes in liquidation of the mort-
(2)
gage-debt.
Is the Insurance by the ::ortgal-ee of the
Property or of the Debt?
A frequent question in the cases bearing on this
subject is whether the insurance by the mort-agee is of
the property or of the debt. The rig-ht of the insurer
to subrogation is granted in either case; but it might b2
regarded by some as more justifiable and logical if the
(2) 43 IT. 3s9(2) Yfood, or- Insurance 471.
r) .
insurance is of the debt simply, Eearly or quite all of'
the early cases favor this view,evern thoujag the policy in
express terms provided that the mortgagee's interest was
(I)
in,ured to cover specific property. Judge Story says;
"Where the mort,'agee insures solely on his own. account, it
is but an insurance of his debt, and if his debt is after-
wards paid or extinguished, the polic, ceases from that
(2),, (3)
time to have any operation. In Insurance Co. V. Woodruff
the court says; "That the insurance by the mortgagee was
necessaril - an insurance of the debt because he has no
other interest." Again, Judge Gibson says; "It is rot
the specific property: which is insured, but its capacity
(1)
to pa, the mortgage-debt,in effect,the security is insured,
On the other hand, the later, and now generally
accepted rule is,that laid down in the M;assachusetts and
later New York cases. Chief Justice Shaw, in King V.
(2)
Insurance Co., sayrs; "The contract of insurance is not
an insurance of the debt or of the payment of the debt;
that would be an insurance of the solvency of the debtor. "
(1) Pa. St. 253; 16 Wend. 35; 4 How. (U. S. ) 1835.
2 Dutcher (26 N.J. L. ) 541, 543; also An,:ell on
Insurance 59.
(2) 4 How. ( U. S. ) 185
(3) 2 Dutcher 541.
(1) 17 Pa. St. 253.
(2) 17 Cush. ( Pa. ) 1.
(3 )
In Kernochar V. Iris. Co., ft rbn, J., 7ives a full
discussion of the vexed question, showing plLinly the
effect of an insurance upon the debt, were it possible.
While admitting the insurance has respect to the debt,
that the mort7age-lieri is the basis and extent of the
right of the mortgarree to insure, he still clrims that tlL
insurance is upon the property the subject of the lien.
The most forcible cxosition, however, is that of Judge(4)
Folger in Excelsior Iris. Co. V. Royal Ins. Co. H1e
says; The insurance is upon the property in its ch:a .cter
as a security for the mortgage-debt. The contradct of th,3
insurer is that the property which constitutes the se-
curity, shall suffer no deterioration by a loss b- fire
during the term of the insurance. If any such loss
happens, the insurer is liable, and it is no concern of
his whether the security remains sufficient to ansver the
debt or not - - - "To saw that it is the debt that is
insured against loss, is to -ive to fire insurance compa-
nies a power to do a kind of business which the law and
their charter do not confer. They are privileged to
insure property against fire; they are not iprivileged to
guarantee the collection of debts. If they are, they may(1)
insure against the insolvency of the debtor,."
(3) 17 n. Y. 435.
(4) 55 M. Y. 343.
(1) 55 N. Y. 343; see also 43 Hurl, 220.
It seems plain that tho mistake made by the courts
in the early decisions was due to the fact th-at the
insurable interest of the mortgagee is limited to the
amount of his debt, and, while both they an) thc later
tribunals meant the same thing, the latter ,'.cre more
accurate in expression. It may be, however, that the
mortgagee was formerly regarded as having no property in
the subject-matter, sufficient to obtain an insurance
upon it.
Insurable Interest- Conclusion.
In the discussion thus far the insurable interest
of the mortgagee has been taken for granted; that such
an interest exists has been so long settled, as to seem a
(1)
work of supererogation to speak of it further.
All that is necessary to be known of it in treating of
subrogation is the root principle of insurance, already
mentioned, that the loss is payable only to the extent
that the insured has an insurable interest; which means,
in the case of the mortgagee, the amount of the mortgage-
debt, and in the case of the mortgagor, the value of
(2)
the property.
(1) But see for full discussion 1 Hall (U.S. Sup. Ct.)
94, 115.
(2) 8 Ins. L. J. 177; Wood on Ins. 257; 22 iT.J. L. 541;
55 N.Y. 343; 51 Il.509; 16 Pet,495; 17 N.Y. 435.
10 ,M.o.App.38 ; /-3 Hun.220;
30.
So also there has been no attempt to treat of the
insurer's right to subrogation as it effects the interests
(:13)
of vendor and vendee, lessor and lessee, debtor and
creditor. The same principles ard reasoning which apply
to the case of mortgagor and mortgagee, apply also to
them. The rirjht to subrogation in each case, is based
on the fact that the person who pays the debt stands in
a position analogous to that of a surety, or is compelled
(1)
to pay to protect his own interests.
Subrogation of insurers in case of life insuranee,
is discountenanced by the courts as contrary to the
(2)
policy of the law.
(3) 9 I. 3. D. 013.
(1) May on Ins. 456; Thomas on :,rortgages p. i3;
55 N. Y., 359.
43 N.J. Eq. (1837) at p.260; s.c. 11 Atl.R.681, 633.
(2) Sheldon on Subrogation, and case cited.
